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While much knowledge is being generated on the impact of the pandemic, we still know very 
little on its implications on taxation in low-income countries. Yet, tax is crucial to fund crisis 
response and recovery, in addition to broader development plans and expanded government 
expenditure. This paper starts addressing this gap using a unique dataset of survey and 
administrative data from Rwanda. We document two significant shifts in taxpayers’ views: 
perceptions about the fairness of the tax system improve by 40 per cent, and their attitudes 
to compliance become more conditional on the provision of public services of sufficiently 
good quality. Importantly, these shifts are accompanied by improvements in actual 
compliance behaviour: using data from tax returns, we show that firms that declare after the 
onset of the crisis are substantially more compliant than others. We then investigate public 
support for increasing various tax options to fund crisis response and recovery. Taxing large 
companies and the richest enjoy the greatest support, which, however, declines as income 
increases. These results allow us to make some recommendations and considerations on tax 
policy responses to the crisis.  
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The COVID-19 pandemic is having profound economic and social implications on the whole 
world. Despite facing much lower case numbers and deaths related to COVID-19, low-
income countries have nonetheless faced massive economic losses. While some evidence is 
emerging on the economic implications of the pandemic in low-income countries, it remains 
much more limited compared to the literature from higher-income contexts (Bishi, Grossman 
and Startz 2020; Djiofack, Dudu and Zeufack 2020; Egger, Jones, Justino, Manhique and 
Santos 2020; Goldberg and Reed 2020; Mahmud and Riley 2020; Ranchhod and Daniels 
2020; Teachout and Zipfel 2020). Even more limited is our knowledge of the ‘tax side’ of the 
pandemic. Most of the evidence on tax focuses on estimating or measuring revenue losses 
resulting from the crisis (Arndt, Davies, Gabriel, Harris, Makrelov, Modise, Robinson, 
Simbanegavi, van Seventer and Anderson 2020; Bachas, Brockmeyer and Semelet, 2020; 
Mascagni and Lees 2021). However, many other questions remain almost entirely 
unanswered. Low-income countries already struggled to improve compliance and revenue 
before the pandemic hit. How does the current crisis affect taxpayers’ attitudes to compliance 
and, importantly, their taxpaying behaviour? And how can governments secure sufficient 
funding for crisis response and recovery at a time when revenue is decreasing, despite being 
more needed than ever? 
 
We aim to address these questions using a unique dataset of survey and administrative data 
from a nationally representative sample of about 2,000 Rwandan small and medium firms 
that are registered with the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA). Our dataset has two unique 
features. The first one is that it includes baseline information collected before the crisis hit 
Rwanda – as well as at multiple times during the crisis. This feature allows us to evaluate the 
crisis’ impact on attitudes, perceptions, and compliance behaviour at different stages of the 
pandemic: before it appeared, the first peak of the crisis, a time of relaxed restrictions, and a 
second wave of infections, this time concentrated in the capital city. We can therefore follow 
shifts in perceptions and attitudes across these different phases, while controlling for all 
observed and unobservable individual-level characteristics that are fixed over the year 
covered by our data. The second unique feature of our dataset is that it includes both survey 
and administrative data, for the same sample and available both before and after the crisis. 
This allows us to check whether shifts in attitudes and perceptions translate in changes in 
actual behaviour. 
 
In addition to the variables we can observe both at baseline and during the crisis, we also 
complemented our baseline questionnaire (which was designed before anyone knew COVID-
19 would become a global pandemic) with questions aimed to capture tax issues that are 
specific to this crisis, such as tax relief and its beneficiaries, the role of informal contributions 
in crisis response, and options for increasing revenue to fund recovery. We use this unique 
dataset to shed light on several unanswered questions on the tax side of the pandemic in a 
low-income country, Rwanda. 
 
The first set of unanswered questions that we seek to address concerns shifts in taxpayers’ 
attitudes to compliance during the crisis. Are they less willing to comply, as paying taxes 
might feel like an additional burden at an already difficult time? Or are they more willing to 
comply, as the crisis made it clearer than ever that taxes are a fundamental tool to fund 
essential public services? Our results suggest that the crisis shifted taxpayers’ attitudes 
towards more conditional views on compliance, making the link between taxes and public 
service provision more salient – as opposed to a more unconditional view on compliance, 
whereby taxes should be paid regardless of what the government provides in return. At the 
same time, we also document a strong improvement in taxpayers’ views on the fairness of 
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the tax system. Both shifts emerge right at the beginning of the crisis, and then persist 
throughout (see section 3.1). 
 
We then investigate whether those significant shifts in attitudes are associated with 
behavioural changes. To do this, we use administrative data from tax returns and a 
difference-in-difference (DiD) framework that exploits the fact that the pandemic hit Rwanda 
during the tax declaration period, thus potentially affecting behaviour only for those taxpayers 
who had not yet filed by that time. We find that compliance, measured as tax paid on 
reported income, increased for those firms that declared after the onset of the crisis – 
suggesting a shift in behaviour along with attitudes (see section 3.2). 
 
The second set of questions regards sources of financing for crisis response and recovery. 
More specifically, how should crisis response be funded? And, going forward, what financing 
options for recovery enjoy the greatest public support? We show descriptive results on 
preferences for various tax options to fund recovery, from our survey data. We show that, 
amongst tax options to fund recovery, Rwandan firms support taxing the rich and large 
corporations over other sources of revenue, such as property tax or taxing everyone equally. 
These results lead us to make some final considerations on concrete policy options for 
governments of low-income countries, and Rwanda in particular (see section 4). 
 
As we discuss in section 2, these results are found in a context where the government 
responded quite forcefully to the pandemic, imposing early and strict lockdowns as soon as 
the first cases of COVID-19 appeared in the country. In this sense, Rwanda is not dissimilar 
to many other low-income countries that have generally responded to the pandemic with 
similar restrictions to those imposed in higher-income contexts, despite much lower case 
numbers (Ray and Subramanian, 2020; Caselli, Grigoli, Lian and Sandri 2020; Walker et al. 
2020). However, Rwanda stands out in other aspects. Perhaps the most important one, 
given the nature of the crisis, is the extensive health insurance coverage that the country 
managed to achieve in recent years – the highest in Africa (Barasa, Kazungu, Nguhiu and 
Ravishankar 2021). The Rwandan government might have also been particularly effective 
both in enforcing restrictions and in quickly adopting support measures, including tax relief, 
as the data presented in section 2 suggests. While our results are not directly applicable to 
other contexts, they start filling the knowledge gap on low-income countries.  
 
Our results complement the scant but increasing literature on revenue losses – estimated or 
actual – associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in low-income countries (Arndt et al. 2020; 
Bachas et al. 2020; Mascagni and Lees 2021). These studies show that the pandemic has 
had a large revenue impact. For example, Arndt et al. (2020) estimate a 32 per cent drop 
across all tax types in South Africa, while Bachas et al. (2020) predict that tax revenue 
remitted by corporations in ten low and middle-income countries would drop by 1.5 per cent 
or 2.5 per cent of GDP under a three-month or five-month shock scenario. Estimates for 
Rwanda predict a 25 per cent drop in corporate income tax revenue in a three-month 
lockdown scenario (Lees, Mascagni, and Santoro 2020), while real-time VAT data show a 
contraction in this tax type of 5.3 per cent in the first three quarters of 2020 (Mascagni and 
Lees 2021). Our paper complements these findings by showing that, while revenue has been 
hit hard, the pandemic might have had positive effects on taxpayers’ perceptions about the 
tax system – and its fairness in particular. The shift towards more conditional forms of 
compliance might be seen in a positive light, as a first step to spur a potential virtuous cycle 
whereby taxpayers are more willing to pay tax, but also demand better services in return – 
with broader potential benefits to government accountability, trust and transparency 




In what follows, we start by presenting our unique survey dataset (section 1). We then 
describe the Rwandan context, its experience with the pandemic and the policy response to 
it, including some initial descriptive statistics from our data (section 2). Sections 3 and 4 then 
present our key results, respectively on shifts in compliance attitudes and behaviour, and on 
options to fund crisis response and recovery. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
1  The Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey 
 
The Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey was implemented as part of a long-standing 
collaboration between the International Centre for Tax and Development and the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority. Originally, we planned for a one-off survey to take place in early 2020. 
Follow-up rounds were added later to capture the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
original purpose of the survey was to generate new analysis on taxpayer compliance that 
would both inform RRA’s policy and contribute to the academic literature. To this aim, we 
designed a questionnaire that includes many of the typical questions of the survey-based 
literature on tax compliance, thus making it largely comparable with other studies.1 However, 
our questionnaire also includes two innovative features. 
 
First, we include three list experiments to test the validity of respondents’ answers on three 
potentially sensitive topics: income under-reporting, the fairness of the tax system, and the 
professionalism of RRA staff. We then compare the results from the list experiments with 
more direct questions on these topics.2 We do not find any evidence of significant biases in 
responses to these questions, which reassures us on the quality of our data. In Appendix 1 
we discuss the details of our list experiments and their results. 
 
Second, our survey includes detailed questions on topics that are less common in the 
survey-based tax compliance literature, such as taxpayer knowledge and informal 
contributions, that allow us to offer a more complete picture of the tax side of the pandemic.3 
We use data on both topics in section 2 to show how informal contributions have filled the 
financing gap in crisis response, and how tax knowledge is strongly associated with access 
to tax relief. More specifically, the survey includes the following key modules: (i) 
demographics, (ii) business characteristics, (iii) risk aversion, (iv) tax knowledge, (v) 
satisfaction with public services, (vi) interactions with RRA, (vii) overall tax burden, and (viii) 
tax compliance attitudes and perceptions.4 
 
Based on this questionnaire, we conducted interviews in January and February 2020 with a 
nationally representative sample of 2,023 small and medium firms randomly sampled from 
the relevant population of taxpayers registered with the RRA for business income tax.5 This 
includes firms that are registered either as corporations, thus subject to corporate income tax 
 
1 For example, a forthcoming ICTD Working Paper reports results based on a very similar survey collected in Sierra 
Leone. Some of our questions on attitudes to compliance are largely comparable with the Afrobarometer survey. 
2 The exact questions we use in this paper are reported in Table A1. 
3 While traditionally the tax compliance literature has not focussed much on these themes, evidence on them has 
increased in recent years (Gangl, Kirchler, Lorenz and Torgler 2017; van den Boogaard, Prichard and Jibao 2019; 
Mascagni, Santoro and Mukama 2019; van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021). 
4 The survey also included two additional modules, that however we do not use here: an experimental video to nudge 
taxpayers to better compliance attitudes and behaviour, and some follow-up questions to capture tax compliance 
outcomes that might be affected by the video. The video was shown to participants at the end of the survey, so it does 
not affect our data – particularly as we do not use any of the (few) variables collected after the video. 
5 Participants were randomly sampled from the population of small and medium business taxpayers in Rwanda. We 
included firms registered in 20 out of 30 districts in Rwanda. We dropped the ten smallest districts to facilitate the 
logistics of data collection, while maintaining the national representativeness of all provinces. 
10 
 
(CIT), or as unincorporated firms or sole proprietorships, thus subject to personal income tax 
(PIT), which in this context is a tax on business profits. Although all firms are registered with 
the RRA, they have three broad types of compliance behaviour: 1) 23 per cent do not file 
declarations, although they should do so as required of all registered taxpayers; 2) 25 per 
cent file nil declarations, defined as reporting zero in all fields; 3) the remaining 52 per cent 
have a more usual behaviour where they report some sales and other information to the 
revenue authority. Non-filing and nil-filing both result in zero tax payments, so these 
taxpayers can be considered unproductive in revenue terms. These seemingly puzzling 
compliance behaviours are quite common in other African countries too (Santoro and Mdluli 
2019; Moore 2020; Mascagni, Santoro, Mukama, Karangwa and Hakizimana 2020; Santoro, 
Groening, Mdluli and Shongwe 2020). Table A2 reports basic descriptive statistics for our 
baseline sample. 
 
The data collected in January and February 2020 are our baseline round. At this time, we 
were not planning to conduct any further rounds of data collection. This changed with the 
appearance of COVID-19 in Rwanda, in late March 2020, when we saw an opportunity to 
use these data to track the implications of the crisis on the compliance variables we collected 
pre-pandemic. We therefore implemented three follow-up rounds of data collection on the 
same sample in May 2020, September 2020, and February 2021. In section 2, we describe 
in more detail how these data rounds map with key stages in the crisis: right after the first 
national lockdown, at a time of relaxed restrictions, and at the height of a second wave of 
infections corresponding with a second lockdown, this time localised in the capital city. Our 
complete dataset therefore allows us to compare key variables in a context that was 
essentially free of COVID-19, in early 2020, and at subsequent stages of the crisis. Crucially, 
we are able to do so with the same sample, since our dataset is a panel. This allows us to 
control for a set of characteristics, both observable and unobservable, that remain fixed over 
the year of our data period. By doing this, we can identify the impact of the pandemic 
precisely, especially since no other major event occurred in Rwanda during the data period. 
 
Since our data are high-frequency and collected for the same sample, we tried to keep the 
questionnaires in follow-up rounds as short as possible, to minimise attrition and fatigue. We 
therefore only included key questions from the following baseline models: tax compliance 
attitudes and perceptions, overall tax burden, and satisfaction with public services. All other 
variables, mainly taxpayer and business characteristics, are only observed at baseline. This 
is the dataset that allows us to identify the shifts in perceptions and attitudes that we discuss 
in sections 3.1 and 2.2, the latter in relation to informal contributions. In addition, we also 
included questions that are specific to the crisis, for example on business closures, access to 
and awareness of tax relief, on preferred options to fund recovery, and on satisfaction with 
the government response to the crisis, amongst others. We use this information to set out the 
context of crisis response in section 2 and to discuss funding options in section 3. The key 
variables used in our analysis are described in the appendix. 
 
A final note is due on attrition. Despite our efforts to minimise attrition, inevitably some 
respondents dropped out during the course of our data period. We have a fully balanced 
sample of 1,503 firms that are observed in all rounds – a 26 per cent drop compared to the 
baseline sample. However, all 2,023 taxpayers observed at baseline have been interviewed 
in at least one of the follow-up rounds, while for 85 per cent of the sample we have at least 
two follow-up observations. Table A3 shows that the balanced panel includes taxpayers 
which are quite different from those left out – they are more likely to be individuals out of 
Kigali, older and less educated, IT-sophisticated and tax-savvy. For this reason, we retain all 
taxpayers in an unbalanced panel. Also, by its design, the fixed-effect model would 





The survey data described so far have then been matched with administrative data from tax 
returns, thanks to unique identifiers from the taxpayer registry. Administrative data typically 
include a much more narrow set of variables, compared to a survey, such as: registration as 
a CIT or PIT taxpayer, reported income, reported expenses, tax liability, location, and some 
imprecise information on sectors. Crucially, the information on reported income and taxes 
can be used to evaluate shifts in compliance behaviour, which we do in section 3.2 – along 
with a more detailed description of the administrative dataset we use for that purpose. 
 
 
2  Rwandan context, crisis response, and tax 
relief 
 
Rwanda is a small landlocked country of nearly 13 million people. It reported a tax to GDP 
ratio of 14.4 per cent in 2018, slightly below the average for Sub-Saharan African countries 
(15.4 per cent) and above low-income countries (13.1 per cent).6 More generally, Rwanda’s 
performance on tax has been strong, especially considering the near absence of natural 
resources that often drive up tax ratios of other African countries. The RRA, established in 
1998, is considered one of the most efficient and modern tax administrations on the African 
continent – despite facing many of the common challenges amongst low-income countries 
(LIC), such as a large informal sector and weak tax compliance. The main tax types in 2019, 
as a share of total revenue, are: VAT (33 per cent), PAYE (24 per cent), CIT and PIT (20 per 
cent) and excise (11 per cent) – as reported in Rwanda Revenue Authority 2020. The firms in 
our survey sample are registered for either PIT or CIT, which are both taxes on business 
profits.7 They might also remit VAT, if they are above the relevant threshold, and PAYE, if 
they have employees – as well as other taxes at the national and sub-national level. One 
striking fact emerging from our survey, which we discuss in more detail in section 2.2, is that 
the typical firm in our sample is much more likely to pay fees and informal contributions at the 
local and community level (e.g. cleaning fees, communal work) than the formal taxes they 
are registered for. Our tax knowledge module confirms what other studies have already 
documented: tax knowledge is rather low amongst our respondents (Mascagni et al. 2019). 
The average taxpayer in our sample responded correctly to only 44 per cent of the eight 
basic tax questions we included in our tax quiz at baseline.  
 
Rwanda’s experience with the pandemic has been similar to other low-income African 
countries, where case numbers have remained relatively low but restrictions have been quite 
strict (Mascagni and Lees 2021). The first case of COVID-19 appeared in Rwanda on 14 
 
6 Source: ICTD/UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset. Figures refer to tax revenue, not total revenue.  
7  PIT is a tax on un-incorporated businesses. There are three reporting regimes, depending on the business’ turnover: 1) 
real regime, 2) lump-sum regime, and 3) flat-amount regime. Large businesses in the real regime have to submit full 
books of accounts to RRA, while smaller businesses are subject to less strict bookkeeping rules under the other two 
simplified regimes. The declaration deadline is 31 March, for the year ending on 31 December. The tax rate in the PIT 
real regime is progressive, depending on income: turnover below RWF 360,000 (around US$ 354) is exempted from 
taxation; between RWF 360,001 and RWF 1,200,000 (around US$ 1,180) is taxed at 20 per cent; higher incomes are 
taxed at 30 per cent. Small enterprises (turnover between RWF 12 million (around US$ 11,780) and RWF 50 million 
(around US$ 50,000) per tax period) are subject to a lump-sum tax of 3 per cent of turnover. Microenterprises 
generating a turnover of more than RWF 2 million (around US$ 1,970) and less than RWF 12 million are required to pay 
a flat amount between RWF 60,000 (around US$ 59) and RWF 300,000 (around US$ 295), depending on income 
(Rwanda Revenue Authority 2017: Articles 11 and 12). CIT is a tax on corporate business profits, which has to be 
declared annually by 31 March, as for PIT. Corporate income is levied at a flat rate of 30 per cent. CIT taxpayers are 
typically larger than PIT ones, being generally more sophisticated organisations that rely less on one individual 
businessperson. However, simplified regimes are also available for CIT taxpayers, although there are relatively few 
corporations small enough to qualify for them (RRA 2017). 
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March, well after we completed data collection for the baseline round. The government 
immediately announced some initial restrictions and a week later imposed a national 
lockdown, which lasted for six weeks. Our first follow-up data were collected in May 2020, 
shortly after the national lockdown was lifted – though some softer restrictions remained in 
place (e.g. on international travel and on movements outside the house, as well as a curfew). 
In the following months the country continued to experience low case numbers, and 
restrictions generally remained more relaxed. Our second follow-up round happened in this 
context, in September 2020, when case numbers were still below 1.5 per million people. The 
situation changed quite dramatically in early 2021, when the country experienced an 
unprecedented spike in infections – though still well below anything the typical higher-income 
country has experienced. Our last data round, collected in February 2021, covers this second 
period of increased cases and a second lockdown, which however this time only concerned 
the capital, Kigali. The rest of the country remained subject to softer restrictions on 
movement and gatherings, and a dusk to dawn curfew. Figures A1 and A2 report 
respectively case numbers and the stringency index for Rwanda during our data period. 
Figure 1 maps the key developments of the pandemic in Rwanda against our data rounds. 
 
Figure 1 Timeline of crisis and data rounds 
 
A recent analysis of the impact of the pandemic in Rwanda, based on data from VAT 
declarations, shows that economic activity contracted by 10 per cent in 2020, with the largest 
drop happening in correspondence with the lockdown imposed around March and April 2020 
(Mascagni and Lees 2021). Our survey data, focussing particularly on small and medium 
firms, complement those results and confirm the severe impact of the crisis on Rwandan 
firms. Table 1 shows that two-thirds of firms stopped operating for reasons related to COVID-
19 in the first national lockdown, while in the second one only a third did so: 35.8 per cent of 
firms located in Kigali, where the lockdown was implemented, and 27.8 per cent of the 
overall sample. These figures might suggest that, a year after the onset of the crisis, more 
firms were prepared to remain open and comply with distancing and other requirements, or 
that rules were applied somewhat more softly to contain the economic impact. Business 
income also dropped dramatically, as self-reported by respondents in our interviews. After an 
initial drop of 85 per cent compared to the baseline, average sales rebounded to about 43 
per cent of pre-crisis levels, and then continued to rise – but only to 53 per cent of the pre-
crisis level by February 2021. These large drops – larger than the overall figures found in 
other studies – are consistent with the finding that small firms, which are the focus of our 
survey, have been hit more than larger ones by the pandemic (Mascagni and Lees 2021). 
However, once we take average sales conditional on being operational, the drop is much 
less dramatic, as expected.8  
 
8 The fact that the drop in sales, conditional on remaining operational, is more modest might reflect the fact that the 
minority of firms who remained open during the lockdown picked up consumption that would otherwise have been 




In terms of policy response, the Rwandan government has been rather active to put 
measures in place that would mitigate the effect of the crisis. This is reflected in an 
exceptionally high level of satisfaction with the government response to the crisis, as 
gathered in the second follow-up round: over 80 per cent of our respondents rate the 
government response as 8 or above, out of 10, where the latter indicates an excellent 
response. Table 1 shows that during the national lockdown of March–April 2020, nearly 70 
per cent of respondents accessed some form of relief, while nearly 41 per cent benefited 
from tax relief more specifically – of which tax deferrals are the most common type. After this 
initial crisis peak, the percentage of respondents receiving any support dropped to 22.4 per 
cent and increased again to 31.7 per cent in correspondence to the second wave of 
infections in February 2021. Tax relief decreased dramatically in September 2020, compared 
to May, and increased again in February. These shifts correspond both to peaks in 
infections, but also to the timeline of income tax declarations, which are due between 
January and March each year. We discuss these policy and tax responses in more detail in 
the next section. 
 
Table 1 Impact of the crisis on firms and policy response 
 
Baseline May ‘20 Sept ‘20 Feb ‘21 
1. Firms closed due to COVID-19 (%) - 66.5 11.6 27.8 
2. Sales (USD) 5,947 892 2,544 3,181 
3. Sales (USD) if remained open 6,255 2,058 2,895 3,755 
4. Received any support (%) - 69.8 22.4 31.7 
5. Accessed any tax relief (%) - 41.0 8.1 25.9 
6. Accessed tax deferral (%) - 39.3 4.6 23.6 
7. Accessed tax waiver (%) - 2.0 1.9 0.9 
8. Accessed tax reduction (%) - 1.3 3.3 3.1 
9. Accessed local tax relief (%) - 23.1 4.0 7.4 
N obs 2,023 1,864 1,778 1,612 
Notes: a full description of the variables reported here is available in Table A1. ‘Sales’ reports the average monthly sales for the 
full sample (row 2) and conditional on firms not closing due to COVID-19 (as shown in row 1) in the relevant survey round (row 
3). Variables on whether taxpayers accessed various forms of tax relief are not additional, as they could have received multiple 
forms of tax relief. So the values at rows 6 to 9 do not have to add up to those in row 5. 
 
2.1 Tax administration response and tax relief 
 
In line with the broader background outlined above, the RRA has quickly adopted measures 
to respond to the crisis and support taxpayers. Our survey data include some information 
about access to tax relief, both at the national and sub-national level. We can therefore make 
three considerations on the tax administration response to the crisis and tax relief in 
particular – which set the context for the results we present in the rest of the paper, on 
attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. 
 
First, we asked respondents a general question on what were the main types of support they 
received during the crisis. Tax relief emerged as a prominent form of support: in the first 
follow-up round of May 2020, 41 per cent of respondents reported having received some kind 
of tax relief, as reported in Table 1, followed by ‘access to services’ (34 per cent). The 
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prominence of tax relief is perhaps unsurprising given that the pandemic hit Rwanda exactly 
in correspondence with the tax declaration period ending on 31 March 2020 (see sections 2 
and 3.2). Consistently, tax relief dropped in September and increased in February, which 
again corresponds to the tax declaration period for the following year (January–March 2021). 
Over the whole period, tax relief remained the most common kind of support. In line with the 
prominence of tax relief, the RRA emerged as the second most important player (after 
private companies and banks), when we asked respondents who the actors providing relief 
were.  
 
Second, amongst various types of tax relief, by far the most common is deferrals of tax 
declarations and payments: they represent about 96 per cent of all forms of tax relief in wave 
1 (57 per cent in wave 2 and 91 per cent in wave 3; see Table 1).9 RRA has indeed granted 
taxpayers various deferrals during the crisis, for both income tax and VAT declarations. We 
discuss this deferral in more detail in section 3.2 as it is key to our empirical strategy. Other 
types of tax relief included fast-tracking VAT refunds, and a waiver of fines, penalties and 
interest related to late payments. Given their more specific nature, it is not surprising that 
these have been less widely accessed. It is also possible that take up for these more 
complex forms of relief might have been relatively lower, which is consistent with weak 
taxpayer knowledge (see section 2) and its role in determining the reach of tax relief (see 
below).  
 
Third, even the more widespread relief on national taxes is still far from being accessed by 
the majority of taxpayers. In fact, many of our respondents did not access tax relief at all. At 
least for the May 2020 round, this may be due to the fact that many taxpayers had already 
submitted their declarations by the time the deferral was announced on 24 March (also see 
section 3.2). However, even considering those who had not yet filed, and could therefore 
have benefited from deferrals, only 56 per cent actually took it up, based on the May data 
round. To investigate the correlates of relief take up in more detail, we run a descriptive 
regression explaining access to tax relief with a number of taxpayer characteristics and 
perceptions, using the first follow-up data round and including only those taxpayers who had 
not yet filed by the time relief was available – to make sure we only capture the most relevant 
group. While this regression does not allow for any causal interpretation, it is still useful to 
provide insights on who has been reached by the relief programme and who has not. Table 
A4 shows that access to tax relief is greater for respondents with higher education and tax 
knowledge, as well as for younger taxpayers and those with better perceptions about the 
fairness of the tax system. These results confirm the importance of tax knowledge to allow 
taxpayers to take up provisions and measures that benefit them. They also highlight the 
importance of conducting effective communication campaigns alongside relief packages. 
 
2.2 The role of local fees and informal contributions 
 
Local fees and informal contributions are a common source of financing for development in 
LICs, especially at the local and community level (van den Boogaard, Prichard and Jibao 
2018). They refer, for example, to contributions to financing public services, such as 
education, payments made to local chiefs and community leaders, local fees for functions 
like funerals and weddings, and in-kind contributions such as communal labour to clean 
public spaces or to carry out local development projects (van den Boogaard et al. 2019; Lust 
and Rakner 2018; Paler, Prichard, Sanchez de la Sierra and Samii 2017; Olken and Singhal 
2011; Prud’homme 1992). These payments are not taxes in a strict sense, but they have a 
certain degree of similarity to taxes, in several dimensions: they are often compulsory, they 
fund essential public services, and they fill the financing gap that would otherwise be covered 
 
9 The deadline for submitting declarations and making payments is the same. 
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by public revenue, at least partly, if a sufficient amount of it was available. In fact, many LICs 
– including Rwanda – collect in tax less than the 15 per cent of GDP commonly cited as the 
minimum amount needed to fund basic government functions (Gaspar, Jaramillo and 
Wingender 2016). This makes these informal contributions key to obtaining a complete 
picture of tax systems in LIC and, more specifically, of funding options for crisis response 
and recovery. 
 
Recognising their importance even in ‘normal’ times, our baseline survey already included 
some questions on local fees and informal contributions. More specifically, at baseline we 
asked a set of simple yes/no questions to gather whether respondents contributed or not to a 
number of specific payments and contributions, from a list that covers the most common 
types in Rwanda.10 Our questionnaire did not include questions on the amounts of each of 
these contributions, as it was beyond the scope of the survey. At baseline, we also asked 
respondents how they rated the fairness of these contributions. Already before the crisis, we 
found two striking results. First, informal contributions are indeed incredibly common in 
Rwanda. Our respondents are, in fact, much more likely to make those informal payments 
than to pay formal taxes – despite our sample being entirely composed of registered 
taxpayers.11 Second, fairness perceptions around these informal contributions are very high: 
over 87 per cent of our respondents rate them as fair or very fair, compared to 67 per cent for 
formal taxes. 
 
In the follow-up survey rounds, we reminded respondents of their response on the types of 
fees and contributions they paid and followed up by asking whether they experienced any 
relief with respect to these contributions, in relation to the COVID-19 crisis, and we repeated 
the fairness question. More importantly, we also included an additional module in all follow-
up surveys to investigate the role of these contributions in the specific context of the crisis. 
We asked whether respondents made contributions to new projects related to the COVID-19 
crisis, what kinds of projects they contributed to (e.g. community feeding programmes), what 
and how much they contributed (e.g. in kind or in cash), who organised them (e.g. community 
or religious leaders), and whether they feel these project contributions are fair. These data 
allow us to highlight four important facts about informal contributions and their role in crisis 
response, particularly in relation to COVID-related projects.12 
 
First, we can confirm that informal contributions have played an important role in funding 
crisis response. Forty-three per cent of our respondents contributed to new COVID-related 
projects in May 2020 (round 1), while this figure increased to 48 per cent in September 2020 
and February 2021 (rounds 2 and 3). The vast majority of contributions (about or above 90 
per cent) in all survey rounds went to community feeding programmes. These programmes 
 
10  The list was developed in close cooperation with RRA staff and our local survey company to ensure it captured the most 
important types, and tested in a pilot to our main survey. 
11 While, for example, 90 per cent reported contributing through communal labour (this figure is similarly high for cleaning 
fees, for example), only 24.5 per cent reported paying PIT or CIT. The latter figure remains slightly below 80 per cent 
even once we exclude from the sample non-filers and nil-filers (see section 1). The percentage of respondents who 
reported making the relevant payments or contributions is as follows, in our baseline data. For local fees: cleaning fees 
(89 per cent), fees for official documentation (71 per cent), funeral fees (36 per cent), parking fees (34 per cent) and 
marriage fees (28 per cent). For informal contributions: weddings (94 per cent), Umuganda (a form of communal labour, 
90 per cent), funeral-related (82 per cent), family-related (69 per cent), religious (68 per cent) and school-related (62 per 
cent). 
12 Our results focus on COVID-19-specific projects because other contributions are too varied to yield meaningful results 
without looking at the details of each specific type of contribution, which we do not have. While some contributions can 
be expected to increase, others will likely decrease or remain the same (e.g. weddings, communal labour). In fact, when 
we asked if the overall burden from these contributions increased, decreased or remained the same on average during 
the crisis, the majority reported that it remained the same – possibly because of variations in opposite directions 




were mostly organised by village committees, or by local administrative units and religious 
leaders. 
 
Second, these contributions are highly regressive, in line with the scant but increasing 
literature on this subject (van den Boogaard and Santoro 2021; Paler et al. 2017; Olken and 
Singhal 2011). Figure 2 shows the amount contributed to projects as a ratio of income, as 
self-reported in the survey, across quintiles of income. We focus on contributions in cash 
because the quantification for these is easier and requires fewer assumptions than for in-kind 
ones. The figure clearly shows a decreasing trend in the incidence of contributions as income 
increases, from about 19 per cent in the bottom quintile to about 2 per cent in the top one 
(both figures from round 1). While this trend is more evident in round 1, it can be observed in 
all rounds. Regressivity in this case is particularly striking because it refers to new projects 
related to COVID-19 (mostly community feeding programmes, as discussed above), and not 
to fees that by their own nature would be regressive (e.g. lump-sum fees charged for specific 
services or purposes). Notwithstanding regressivity, Figure A3 shows that the probability of 
making a contribution of any kind (in cash or in kind) increases with income. This indicates 
that richer respondents are more likely to contribute than poorer ones, but when they do, they 
contribute less on average than poorer ones – at least as far as in-cash contributions are 
concerned. 
Figure 2 Incidence on income (%) of contributions to COVID-19 projects by income 
deciles 
 
Notes: results based on data from the Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey. 
 
Third, despite their regressivity, perceptions around these contributions remained strikingly 
positive. As many as 95 per cent of respondents viewed COVID-specific contributions as fair 
or very fair in rounds 2 and 3, rising from 79 per cent in round 1. 
 
Finally, and in line with section 2.1, we explored the extent of tax relief granted for this type of 
contribution. While in the previous section we show that formal tax relief has been prominent 
during the crisis, relief has been much less common at the sub-national level, with only 24 
per cent of respondents in May 2020 confirming they had received any relief for this type of 
payment – much lower than the corresponding figure for national taxes (41 per cent). This 
pattern can be observed both in Kigali and in other areas of the country: the level of tax 
support has been comparable across the country for national taxes, while it has been much 
lower for local taxes.  
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3  Shifts in tax compliance: attitudes and 
behaviour 
 
Against the background highlighted in the previous section, we now investigate whether the 
crisis – and the Rwandan government’s response to it – have shifted compliance attitudes 
and behaviour in any significant way. The methods for identifying these shifts are different for 
attitudes and behaviour, as the empirical framework and data are different: survey data on 
the former and administrative data on the latter. Importantly, however, in both cases we can 
observe the relevant variables before and after the shock (see section 1). We provide more 
detailed notes on methods in the respective sections. 
 
3.1 Tax attitudes and perceptions 
 
To identify shifts in attitudes and perceptions, we exploit the panel nature of our data and the 
fact that we can observe periods both before and after the onset of the crisis, as described in 
section 1. More precisely, we run a set of fixed effects regressions to evaluate the impact of 
different stages of the crisis on six outcomes of interest: perceptions about the unfairness of 
the tax system, trust in the RRA, compliance attitudes conditional on receiving public 
services of good quality, unconditional compliance attitudes (which is the alternative 
statement to the one on conditional compliance, as reported in Table A1), the acceptability of 
reduced compliance due to financial constraints and, finally, whether taxpayers believe 
evasion is never justified (another indicator of unconditional compliance). These outcomes 
are defined more precisely in the discussion below and the exact questions they refer to, as 
well as their measurement, are reported in Table A1. The regressions we estimate are based 
on equation 1, where Yit is one of the relevant outcomes listed above. The coefficients of 
interest are β1, β2, and β3, which capture the effect of three dummy variables corresponding 
to each follow-up data round: May 2020 (round1), September 2020 (round2) and February 
2021 (round3). γi captures the fixed effects: all the observable and unobservable factors that 
remain fixed over time, within individual respondents, during our data period. They include 
factors such as gender, location, sector, and even other characteristics such as the level of 
education or business practices. While some of these variables may change over longer 
periods of time, we can reasonably expect very little or no variation over the year of our data 
period – especially as no other major event occurred in Rwanda in addition to the pandemic. 
In addition to fixed effects, we also control for business income (bincome), as self-reported by 
respondents during the survey, which saw drastic variations during the crisis, as described in 
section 3. εit is an error term. 
 
  (1) 
Figure 3 plots the coefficients on round1, round2 and round3 estimated based on equation 1, 
with the relevant confidence intervals. The dotted line represents the baseline value of each 
relevant variable. Since the baseline round is the excluded category in equation 1, all other 
rounds’ coefficients are evaluated in comparison to it. Each individual graph in Figure 3 
corresponds to a separate regression on the dependent variable indicated at the top of each 
one. These results point to significant shifts in all variables, which we discuss in turn in the 




Figure 3 Shifts in attitudes and perceptions 
 
Notes: results based on Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey. Graphs show coefficients on round1, round2 and round3 (see 
equation 1) from fixed effects regressions on the relevant outcome, indicated at the top of each graph. 
 
Unfairness refers to a true/false question asking whether the tax system is unfair. While this 
is a direct question, the list experiment mentioned in section 1 does not point to any 
significant bias in responses to this direct question, as we discuss in more detail in Appendix 
1. Compared to baseline, perceptions around the fairness of the tax system improve 
significantly at the onset of the crisis in May 2020 (round 1). The magnitude is large: given 
the baseline level of 0.26, a decrease of 0.1 (the coefficient on round 1) in taxpayers 
reporting the system is unfair represents a 40 per cent improvement in this indicator.13 This 
shift persists, with a similar magnitude, at the other stages of the crisis that we capture in 
rounds 2 and 3. Relatedly, Figure A4 shows that a similar positive shift can also be observed 
for the informal contributions described in section 2.2. 
 
Trust captures whether respondents have trust that the RRA acts in the interest of taxpayers 
like them (see Table A1). In round 1, we observe a significant shift in a negative direction, 
with trust in the RRA decreasing by 3.5 per cent compared to a baseline level of 83 per cent 
(see Table A5). The shift in trust then changes direction over time, with a significant increase 
in round 2, somehow offsetting the negative impact in round 1, and an additional (but only 
borderline significant) increase in round 3. It is worth noting that the baseline level is already 
very high, thus potentially leaving less margin for improvement. 
 
The outcome conditional compliance captures attitudes to compliance conditional to public 
services, in the context of fiscal exchange or reciprocity. The relevant question required 
respondents to choose between the following two statements: 1) taxpayers must pay their 
taxes to the government regardless of the quality of public services; or 2) taxpayers could 
refuse to pay taxes if they were not receiving public services of adequate quality.14 Figure 3 
first reports results on a binary variable capturing agreement with the second statement 
(conditional compliance), as well as the exactly specular result when considering agreement 
 
13 Given that the question is framed around unfairness, a negative coefficient represents an improvement in perceptions 
about the fairness of the tax system. 
14 See footnote above. 
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with the first one (unconditional compliance). This indicator shows a large and significant shift 
away from unconditional compliance and towards more conditional views of compliance. The 
latter increase by 35 per cent in round 1, compared to the baseline level of 20 per cent. This 
shift persists in the following rounds as well.15 
 
Importantly, while conditional attitudes to compliance improve, the vast majority of 
respondents (80 per cent) keep agreeing more with the statement on unconditional 
compliance (statement 1 above) – though less so than at baseline. This links to an alternative 
outcome variable on unconditional compliance, labelled never justify in Figure 3. It captures a 
separate question, which is standard in this literature (D’Arcy 2011; Fjeldstad, Schulz-
Herzenberg and Sjursen 2012; Isbell 2017; McCulloch, Moerenhout and Yang 2021), where 
respondents are asked whether they think it is justifiable for some people not to pay taxes on 
their income (see Table A1). Consistently with the two-statements choice discussed above, 
the baseline level of this indicator is very high (85 per cent), indicating that the prevalent 
attitude to compliance in Rwanda is of unconditional nature. While this indicator also sees a 
modest but significant increase in May 2020 (5.5 per cent compared to baseline), right at the 
onset of the crisis, it then settles back to its baseline level in rounds 2 and 3. This result is 
consistent with the significant and persistent shift from unconditional to conditional 
compliance attitudes, while this alternative measure of unconditional compliance only shows 
a small increase and then reverts back to the baseline level after round 1.16 Similarly to trust, 
it is possible that the high baseline level might imply a more limited margin for improvement.  
 
Finally, the outcome variable financial constraints refers to a question aimed to measure the 
extent to which compliance might be affected by businesses’ financial constraints and their 
ability to pay taxes. More specifically, respondents had to choose between the following two 
statements: 1) taxpayers should always declare their full income for tax purposes, regardless 
of their financial constraints; or 2) taxpayers in financial distress could declare less income in 
order to pay a smaller tax.17 Figure 3 plots results on a binary variable capturing agreement 
with the second statement. Results show a sizeable and significant decline in agreement with 
this statement, and conversely an increase in agreement with the idea that taxpayers should 
contribute what they owe regardless of their financial constraints. This suggests that 
taxpayers strengthened their willingness to pay despite the financial drawbacks produced by 
the crisis. This provides an interesting comparison with conditional compliance: while the 
financial constraints brought about by the crisis do not change attitudes to compliance (if 
anything, they see a slight improvement), the crisis makes the link with public services more 
salient – thus increasing conditional compliance, linked to fiscal exchange and reciprocity. 
 
These results, taken together, show that the pandemic generated significant shifts in some 
attitudes and perceptions around tax. The largest ones are towards better perceptions about 
the tax system’s fairness and more conditional views on compliance, implying a stronger link 
between the quality of public services and tax payments. These shifts can be seen as a 
positive impact of the crisis, as fairness, trust, and reciprocity (i.e. the link between taxes and 
public services) are key to improving taxpayer quasi-voluntary compliance, through improved 
trust, accountability and transparency of tax systems – all of which should, ultimately, also 
allow for sustainable increases in tax revenue (Luttmer and Singhal 2014; Prichard et al. 
2019). The results on financial constraints are consistent with these positive shifts and 
 
15 Since the two outcomes of conditional and unconditional compliance come from the same question, and indeed they are 
alternatives, the relevant coefficients almost exactly mirror each other. 
16 Note that this question on ‘never justify’ is not directly related to the other one, so we would not expect a direct relation 
to the shifts observed on ‘conditional compl.’ and ‘unconditional compl.’. The small (in round 1) and non-significant (in 
rounds 2 and 3) effect in this indicator is consistent with the previous results. 
17 Taxpayers could also decide not to agree with either, but this option was not read out to them. 
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confirm that taxpayers appreciate the importance of tax compliance even at times of financial 
distress. 
 
These shifts fit particularly well in the Rwandan context, where taxpayers are generally aware 
that taxes are the main source of funding for healthcare (70 per cent are aware of this in 
round 1) and are largely satisfied with the healthcare system (75 per cent are very or 
somewhat satisfied with it, while 85 per cent feel confident the healthcare system can help if 
they get sick). The improvements in attitudes that we document here might also be linked to 
the prompt and strong positive response of the Rwandan government, both generally and 
more specifically on tax (see section 2). In fact, our data from round 3 suggest that our 
respondents believe that both solidarity and patriotism have increased during the crisis (see 
Figures A5 and A6) – which is consistent with the positive shifts in attitudes we document 
here.18 Similar ‘rally round the flag’ effects of the pandemic have been documented in other 
contexts, largely in European countries (Schraff 2020; Baekgaard, Christensen, Madsen and 
Mikkelsen 2020; Kritzinger, Foucault, Lachat, Partheymuller, Plescia and Brouard 2021).19 
However, it is unclear whether these shifts persist over the longer term, both in our study and 
in the broader literature (Johansson, Hopmann and Shehat 2021). What we can show is that, 
at least over the period we can observe, the shifts in fairness (with both formal and 
local/informal contributions) and conditional compliance are not only an immediate ‘rally 
round the flag’ effect, but they also persist at times when the crisis was less acute in Rwanda 
(i.e. round 2). There is certainly a need for more research to investigate longer term effects, 
and we indeed intend to keep collecting follow-up data and update the analysis to capture 
subsequent phases. 
 
Finally, we check whether these shifts are driven by particular groups. We explore 
heterogeneity on location (Kigali vs. other provinces), gender, CIT or PIT (as described in 
section 2), compliance categories (nil-filers, non-filers and active taxpayers, as defined in 
section 1), and firm size based on self-reported business income. The results are reported in 
figures A7 to A11. We see no clear differences in any significant direction, except for some 
expected minor differences that, however, do not appear to be systematic across groups. For 
example, while the shift in fairness is the same across PIT and CIT payers, the latter (which 
are also larger firms) don’t experience the same shift towards conditional compliance (see 
Figure A7). However, we are reluctant to read much into these results, both because no 
systematic pattern emerges, and because estimates are affected by smaller sample sizes 
(especially for CIT and the top quintile; see section 1). It is also worth noting that taxpayers in 
Kigali see an increase in the ‘never justify’ variable in round 3, corresponding to the second 
lockdown, localised in the capital, as compared to those in the provinces (Figure A8). This is 
consistent with the increase in this variable we observe during the first national lockdown 
(round 1 in Figure 3). 
 
In addition, we also check whether having been affected by the crisis through business 
closure or having accessed relief affect the way in which perceptions shift. Again, we do not 
observe any major difference across these groups, except for a slightly weaker improvement 
in unconditional compliance amongst those experiencing a business closure or receiving tax 
relief, but only in round 1. At the same time, firms experiencing a closure in round 1 are more 
likely to increase their trust in the RRA. Results on these additional dimensions of 
heterogeneity are reported in tables A6 and A7. These results show that the shifts we 
 
18  Questions on perceptions around solidarity and patriotism were only included in round 3, to help interpret and unpack 
the results on shifts in other perceptions. 
19 These studies largely focus on trust in government rather than the broader set of perceptions we use here. Our results 
on trust do not show a rally round the flag effect in the first round, but there is an increase in the second round, as 
shown in Figure 3. Similar studies focussing on crises in low-income countries are scarce, but the ones that are 
available show that such effects are far from guaranteed in these contexts (Crisman 2020). 
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document here are not simply due to respondents’ satisfaction with having received tax relief 
– instead, they are more widespread across the population and consistent with general 
increases in solidarity and patriotism, as discussed above.  
 
3.2 Compliance behaviour 
 
Are the improvements in attitudes and perceptions, documented in the previous section, 
associated with better compliance behaviour? To answer this question, we use 
administrative data that we can match to the survey sample, as described in section 1. The 
dataset is composed of income tax declarations submitted by taxpayers to the RRA for fiscal 
years 2012 to 2019. We focus on income taxes because our sample includes taxpayers 
registered for PIT or CIT, both taxes in business income, while only a portion of the sample 
also pay other taxes like the VAT (see section 1). 
 
CIT and PIT declarations are filed annually and refer to the fiscal year running from January 
to December. Taxpayers are then allowed three months after the end of the fiscal year, until 
the end of March, to submit their declaration. The last year of available data refer to fiscal 
year 2019 and the relevant declarations were filed in the first three months of 2020. This 
implies that actual economic activity as reported in these declarations was not affected by the 
crisis, as it had already happened in 2019. However, there might be a compliance response 
to the crisis, reflected in reporting behaviour, as reporting for 2019 happened in early 2020. 
In section 3.1 we show that, already in May 2020, taxpayers’ views had shifted towards 
better perceptions on the fairness of the tax system and more conditional attitudes to tax 
compliance, making the link with public services more explicit. If these shifts were to translate 
into actual behaviour, taxpayers might be more compliant than they would have been 
otherwise, in absence of the crisis, notwithstanding the same level of real economic activity. 
This is the hypothesis we aim to test in this section. 
 
To this aim, we exploit the fact that the pandemic hit Rwanda during the declaration period, 
which ends on 31 March. More specifically, the first case was confirmed on 14 March, the 
lockdown was imposed on 21 March, and tax relief was announced and made available from 
24 March, as summarised in Figure 1. By the time these events happened, some taxpayers 
had already filed their declaration for 2019, while others had not yet done so. We can 
therefore use these dates as cut-offs to divide taxpayers between those who filed their 
declaration in a world in which COVID-19 was largely a ‘foreign’ issue, and those who filed 
after the pandemic had become very much a Rwandan problem as well. Our main 
specification uses the 24 March cut-off because by this time government action, both through 
general restrictions and tax relief more specifically, would have made the pandemic, and its 
link to taxes, visible and salient to all Rwandan firms. However, we also test the robustness 
of our results to other cut-off choices. Based on our preferred cut-off, our sample splits 
roughly equally between the ‘control’ and ‘treatment’ groups. 
 
Exploiting this feature, we use a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework to identify if those 
in the treated group – who filed in a context where COVID-19 was present in Rwanda – show 
any significant difference in behaviour compared to those in the control group – who filed 
before the pandemic became a salient national problem in Rwanda. In other words, firms that 
declared on or before 24 March are in the control group, while those that filed after are 
‘treated’. Treatment and control groups are defined each year to identify those who submit 
their declarations before or after the cut-off in each year – a feature we come back to later. 
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The dependent variable is the tax liability remitted by each taxpayer, which can be observed 
in the administrative dataset.20 
 
Similarly to survey data, we can observe tax outcomes before the pandemic – fiscal years 
2018 and earlier – and after the pandemic – year 2019, for which declarations were filed in 
early 2020. We estimate equation 2 using a fixed effects model, where Yit is the outcome of 
interest (tax liability) at time t for firm i, βk24marchit is a set of coefficients capturing whether 
the firm filed before or after the cut-off (i.e. our treatment) in the relevant year, β2incomeit is a 
control for business income, and ϕt and γi are time and firm fixed effects. The coefficient of 
interest is β201924marchit. We expect interaction terms between the treatment variable and 
years prior to 2019 to be non-significant (more on this below).  
 
 
Figure 4 reports the coefficients on the interaction terms (i.e. β2012 to β2019) obtained by 
estimating equation 2 on administrative data from tax returns. We only include firms from the 
survey sample that submitted a declaration for fiscal year 2019 and 2018 at least, plus as 
many years as available before that.21 The results show a significant shift in tax liability for 
treated taxpayers, who declared after 24 March 2020, for the declaration referring to 2019 – 
while in previous years the control and treatment groups behave in a statistically 
indistinguishable way (more on this below). The coefficient is also very large: a point estimate 
of RWF 625,418 (around US$ 615) Rwandan Francs, compared to a sample average of 
RWF 941,996 (around US$ 926) in 2019 (Table A11 shows the full regression results). This 
result remains qualitatively the same if we exclude nil-filers from the sample (Figure A12), if 
we drop the control for business income (Figure A13), or if we use the alternative cut-off date 
of 14 March (Figure A14) or 21 March (Figure A15). These results seem to suggest that the 
pandemic also resulted in a shift in compliance behaviour, in addition to the shifts in 
perceptions and attitudes documented in section 3.1. More in detail, the effect on tax seems 
to be driven by an increase in reported business income, as shown in Figure A16, rather than 




20 While the decision to file a return is an important dimension of compliance, we are unable to consider this outcome as, 
by definition, we do not observe the date on which a non-filer submits their return, as they just do not. The date of 
submission is the key variable used to identify treated and untreated taxpayers in the DiD framework. When this 
information is not available, as for non-filers, we cannot set up any DiD regression.  
21 We also include nil-filers, for which tax liability is zero. We also run a robustness test excluding them, which yields 
largely consistent results. 
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Figure 4 Shifts in compliance behaviour 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference 
coefficients (treat x year) from a fixed effects regression. 
 
Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of our results across groups. The most interesting 
result here is on business size, defined as deciles of sales. Figure A21 shows that the effect 
on behaviour seems to be largely driven by firms in the top decile, while there is no 
statistically significant effect for those in deciles 1 to 9.22 This would also help make the large 
effect size we found in Figure 4 more plausible: any change coming primarily from large 
taxpayers would necessarily be quite large, in absolute value, compared to the average of 
the full sample. It is, however, in contrast with the lack of substantial differences in the way 
larger or smaller taxpayers shift their attitudes and perceptions during the crisis (see section 
3.1). Similarly to the results on perceptions, we do not find many systematic or significant 
differences across other sub-groups, such as PIT/CIT, gender, or location (Figures A18 to 
A22).23 
 
The analysis of taxpayer behaviour presented here is useful to check whether shifts in 
perceptions are associated with changes in behaviour. However, it suffers from more 
limitations compared to the analysis of section 3.1. A methodological note is therefore in 
order. One of the key assumptions for DiD estimations to be valid is that units display parallel 
trends pre-treatment. Our setting, however, is not a standard DiD one, because the treatment 
status is defined every year depending on whether the taxpayer filed their declaration before 
or after the cut-off – although, as we explain below, the majority of taxpayers stick with either 
the treatment or the control group across years. In this setting, the non-significance of 
interaction terms pre-2019 in Figure 4 is not a standard test for parallel trends. It shows, 
however, that filing before or after the cut-off does not imply any differences in tax liability per 
se, after controlling for fixed effects, in ‘normal’ years. On the contrary, it does have a 
significant association with higher tax liability in 2019 – the year for which the relevant 
declarations were filed in the first three months of 2020. The key element for identification is 
therefore that this effect is due to the pandemic. This is plausible, as there was no other 
event that could explain particularly high tax liabilities in fiscal year 2019 (e.g. higher than 
usual economic growth) or any event, other than the pandemic, that could have led to 
 
22 The effect on the top decile sub-group is only borderline significant, but the estimation by sub-groups also suffers from 
smaller business size, especially so the sub-group composed of the top decile only. 
23 We do find that the effect seems to be driven primarily by taxpayers registered in Kigali (i.e. the majority of our sample, 
Figure A19) and male respondents (Figure A20), as well as taxpayers who are active or non-filers at baseline, while nil-
filers don’t seem to respond (Figure A22). However, as for perceptions, these results suffer from smaller sample size 
and are therefore to be taken with caution. 
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increased compliance during the declaration period in 2020 (e.g. a government campaign).24 
Identification remains, nonetheless, a limitation that requires further analysis. 
 
While we cannot directly test the parallel trend assumption with our specification, we provide 
two sets of descriptive statistics that might help confirm the validity in our results. First, 
Tables A8, A9, and A10 show differences between taxpayers who file before and after the 
cut-off. While these two groups are indeed different across a wide set of variables, these 
differences are consistent across years, rather than being specific to 2019. For example, 
taxpayers who file after the cut-off are generally larger firms, so they are also more likely to 
be CIT payers, VAT registered, and have employees. Consistently, they are also more 
sophisticated firms, in the sense that respondents are more educated, have higher tax 
knowledge, are more likely to use accountants and have bank accounts, amongst others. 
Since these differences are observed in all years, rather than just for declarations submitted 
in 2020, they should not be responsible for our result. The second statistic is the share of 
‘treated’ taxpayers in 2020 that are also ‘treated’ in previous years. This figure provides an 
indication of the extent to which the treatment group changes composition over time. 
Seventy-two per cent of those who filed after the cut-off for fiscal year 2019 also did so for 
2018, and 58 per cent also did so for 2017.25 The majority of firms are therefore in the 
treatment group each year, although some do switch groups across years, which is largely 
expected.26 While these results are somewhat reassuring, the fact that the effect on 
behaviour is largely driven by large taxpayers requires more analysis, to rule out the 
possibility that our findings are simply driven by the possibility that large taxpayers filed after 
the cut-off in this specific year (2020), by chance or for reasons we are unaware of. Indeed, 
our results are not robust to winsorising or dropping outliers (top 1 per cent), although they 
are confirmed if we simply drop the largest five firms (Table A12).27 
 
However, we also note that the largest taxpayers (top 1 per cent) consistently file after the 
cut-off each year. This suggests that, while our result remains largely dependent on the 
largest taxpayers, they are not simply due to the declaration timing of a handful of large 
firms. Another encouraging result comes from preliminary findings obtained by applying the 
same empirical framework to the universe of taxpayers, rather than only those who took part 
in our survey. With this broader sample size, we confirm our significant result on taxpayer 
behaviour, which now remains robust to winsorising the top 1%.28 
  
 
24 Also see Mascagni and Lees 2021 for an analysis of economic performance in Rwanda in recent years, including the 
pandemic year. 
25 This percentage becomes smaller for earlier years, as we have fewer observations. 
26 It is largely expected that firms might file on different dates each year, so the exact date might fall before or after the 
specific cut-off date in different years. However, Tables A8, A9, and A10 show that firms that declare before and after 
the cut-off show some generally consistent patterns – which is compatible with individual firms switching groups over 
time.  
27 The same mixed evidence arises when we use alternative cut-offs. Tables omitted for the sake of brevity. 
28  This is works in progress, results will be available in a later version of this work.  
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4  Options to fund response and recovery 
 
Finally, we turn to the second set of questions we mentioned in the introduction. More 
specifically: what options do governments in LICs have to fund crisis response and recovery? 
And how much public support do they enjoy? As anticipated in section 1, the follow-up waves 
include information that can help us answer this question. However, the methodology in this 
section is purely descriptive as the relevant sections of our questionnaire were only designed 
and implemented after the onset of the crisis. 
 
As anticipated in the introduction, recent evidence has shown that tax revenue can be 
expected to decline in low-income countries, as a result of the crisis. Two studies in particular 
have quantified these impacts for Rwanda: Mascagni et al. 2020 estimate a 25 per cent loss 
in CIT revenue corresponding to a three-months lockdown, while Mascagni and Lees 2021 
measure a 5.3 per cent loss in VAT revenue in the first three quarters of 2020. To these, one 
would need to add further losses on other tax types, most notably trade taxes that have been 
projected to be the most affected tax type during the pandemic (Arndt et al. 2020). 
Interestingly, Rwandan taxpayers are fully aware of the need to increase tax revenue to 
respond to the crisis. In the second follow-up round we asked them whether they think the 
government needs more revenue to respond to the crisis. The vast majority (90 per cent) 
responded that indeed more revenue is needed. 
 
Against this background, it is both urgent and relevant to reflect on options to increase 
revenue in the aftermath of the crisis. In this section, we report descriptive patterns on 
taxpayers’ preferences for different tax options to fund the response to the pandemic. In all 
three follow-up survey rounds, we invited respondents to think about any kind of help and 
support that the government was currently providing in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, 
such as food provision, cash transfers and improvement in the health service. We then asked 
how the government should get funding for these additional expenses. We provided a range 
of options: more taxes on everyone, more taxes on the richest, more taxes on the largest 
businesses, more taxes on properties, additional foreign aid or loans, and voluntary 
contributions. Respondents were required to express whether they agreed or disagreed that 
each option should be used to increase revenue in the context of the crisis. Responses on 
each option were therefore independent of each other, rather than being alternatives or 
ranked choices. This data allow us to highlight three main results. 
 
First, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the preferred options seem to be non-tax ones: foreign and 
voluntary sources of revenue – with support of about 90 per cent and 96 per cent 
respectively. These preferences are also quite consistent over time, as depicted in Figure 5. 
The high support for foreign aid might seem at odds with the national rhetoric of fiscal self-
reliance promoted by the government, where the country is meant to rely less on foreign 
funding and more on domestic revenue mobilisation to fund development efforts. However, 
the exceptional circumstance of a global pandemic makes it less surprising that Rwandans 
call for international solidarity to face the crisis. On the other hand the support for voluntary 
contributions is fully in line with the very high perceptions of the fairness of informal 
contributions that we documented in section 2.2. While voluntary and informal contributions 
are not the same, we can expect a large degree of overlap between them.29 We can 
therefore draw some links with the results of section 2.2. Most importantly, to the extent that 
our results on regressivity apply to voluntary contributions as well, this financing option is 
particularly problematic as it would bear more heavily on those with lower incomes. Partly 
 
29 Informal contributions are often voluntary in the sense that there is no formal law mandating their payment, but there are 
social norms and community pressure to pay them that make them at least partly coercive. 
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related to its incidence amongst lower-income segments, it is also unclear whether in 
practice informal and voluntary contributions can generate a volume of resources large 
enough to substantially contribute to recovery. 
 
Second, amongst the tax options, taxing large businesses and taxing the richest are the 
options that enjoy the greatest support, at 52 per cent and 45 per cent respectively in May 
2020. In comparison, support for increasing taxes on property or on everyone equally are 
much lower: 13 per cent and 11 per cent respectively in the first follow-up round. 
Interestingly, support for property taxes diverges substantially from taxing the richest, 
although property taxes are a key tool to tax higher-income and wealth individuals in low-
income countries (Goodfellow 2017). These figures on support for various tax options have 
changed very little across the survey rounds, as shown in Figure 5. An important exception is 
support for taxing the richest, which increased by about 10 per cent from the onset of the 
crisis (41 per cent) to round 3 (45 per cent). It is also interesting that, despite this increase, 
there is still a sizeable portion of the population that would not support more taxes on the 
better off – at least not without a clear communication campaign to explain the background 
and rationale.30 For this portion of respondents, we asked a few follow-up questions about 
their lack of support for taxing the richest. Many (83 per cent) believe the richest are affected 
by COVID-19 like everyone else, while for 18 per cent the richest are already over-taxed.31 
This finding fits with the perceptions we captured at baseline and in round 3: the majority of 
taxpayers (78 per cent at baseline and 67 per cent in round 3) believe that the richest already 
pay more taxes than smaller taxpayers – a belief that is largely true, but that does not 
necessarily imply progressivity.32 
  
 
30 The fact that there is generally quite a lot of disinformation around tax suggests that such a campaign might actually be 
an important element in determining public awareness and support. 
31 These figures are not meant to add up to 100 as respondents could choose multiple answers. 
32 The largest firms contribute the vast majority of tax revenue in Rwanda, as in other low-income countries. However, 









Third, we checked how these figures look when we disaggregate responses by quintiles of 
reported income. Perhaps unsurprisingly, support for taxing the richest, as well as large 
corporations and property, decreases with income quite substantially, as shown in Figure 6. 
While Figure 6 is based on round 1, these figures look very similar in other rounds.33 
Illustratively, support for taxing the richest is about 40 per cent in the bottom quintile, 
increases slightly in the second one, then decreases gradually across the income distribution 
to reach a level at the top that is 30 per cent lower (equivalent to about 12 percentage points) 
compared to the bottom of the distribution. These results suggest that political resistance to 
extending tax collection amongst the richest individuals might be high especially amongst the 
most powerful in society, which are often those with higher incomes.34 
Figure 6 Preferences for tax options by income quintiles 
 
Notes: results based on data from the Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper starts to fill the knowledge gap on the impact of the pandemic in low-income 
countries, and particularly on its ‘tax side’. First, we provide some background facts on the 
crisis and the response to it in Rwanda. For example, in section 2.1 we show that, despite 
the Rwandan government’s swift response, many taxpayers still failed to access relief – and 
the probability of doing so is related to taxpayer knowledge. We also document the important 
role of informal contributions in funding crisis response, and their regressivity. 
 
Second, the core of our analysis (section 3.1) shows that the crisis in Rwanda led to shifts in 
some perceptions about tax that can be seen as being positive for long-term revenue 
mobilisation: citizens’ perceptions about the fairness of the tax system improved, and their 
views on compliance became more conditional on the provision of public services of 
sufficiently good quality. Importantly, these shifts are associated with improvements in actual 
behaviour, as taxpayers tended to comply more with their tax obligations after the onset of 
the crisis (section 3.2). 
 
33 Figures omitted for the sake of brevity. 
34 Our data on solidarity show that perceptions around it are quite stable across the distribution, suggesting feelings of 




Third, in section 4 we use our data to reflect on the available tax options to increase revenue. 
We find that support for taxing the richest and large companies is higher than other taxes, but 
still relatively low. The former has however increased during the crisis, perhaps indicating a 
shift in support towards taxing the better off. Perhaps unsurprisingly, support for taxing the 
rich and large companies decreases as the income of respondents increases. This points to 
the possibility that policymakers might find substantial resistance especially from higher-
income people, which would be largely expected. 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that, while the crisis presented unprecedented 
challenges, it might have also brought about new opportunities. In particular, it might allow 
policymakers in low-income countries to strengthen the fiscal contract and to improve equity 
by taxing higher-income groups more effectively. However, to be successful these policy 
changes might need to be accompanied by clear and effective communication campaigns to 
improve knowledge and awareness of basic features of the formal tax system and informal 
contributions, particularly around progressivity and fairness. Consistent with other evidence, 
there seems to be a lot of misinformation amongst citizens about both formal and informal 
taxes (sections 2.2 and 2.1). 
 
Finally, our study is certainly a starting point for more research, rather than being fully 
conclusive in itself. We would like to highlight particularly three directions of research that 
directly stem from our analysis. First, our results refer to Rwanda and are not necessarily 
applicable to other contexts (see the introduction). Similar studies from other countries are 
needed to find common patterns or interesting contrasts – especially as concerns shifts in 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour. Second, more work is needed on the political, social, 
economic and psychological aspects of improving tax compliance and increasing revenue 
from the higher-income segments in society. Third, more research is needed on the role of 
information and knowledge in relation to both formal and informal taxes, during but also 





Appendix 1 List experiments 
List experiments or item-count techniques provide an alternative way of asking sensitive 
questions, which is meant to be less vulnerable to bias. Using these techniques, respondents 
are asked to indicate the number of items on a list of behaviours they engage in or agree 
with. In other words, they are asked to report the total number of items and not to indicate 
which specific items they agree with. The experiment consists in providing some respondents 
with a list that contains a set of items which are by design not controversial, while randomly 
assigning other respondents to a list with an additional sensitive item. By measuring the 
difference in the number of items selected by the two groups of respondents, one can 
estimate the average level of support for or incidence of the sensitive item within the sample 
(Imai 2011). In the survey we also ask the sensitive questions directly and thus are able to 
compare how the list experiments perform compared to those more direct questions. We use 
list experiments to check for biases in questions related to three topics: income under-
reporting, the fairness of the tax system, and the professionalism of the RRA. 
 
Income under-reporting. The non-sensitive item list included I met a client or business 
partner in person, I have travelled out of Rwanda for business, I did NOT use my phone to 
make business calls and All my clients are based in Rwanda. In the treatment list, we added 
the following sensitive item: I did not report all my sales in my tax return. The results do not 
show any increase in self-reported tax evasion between the count in the non-sensitive item 
list (1.76) and the sensitive item list (1.74). The only sub-group who shows an increase in the 
outcome is the nil-filers one, even if the increase is small (5 per cent) and not statistically 
significant. All the other sub-groups, such as PIT/CIT, gender and location do not show any 
change in item counts when the sensitive item is added. Thus, the findings of the list 
experiment are generally inconclusive. 
 
Fairness. The non-sensitive item list included I am proud to be a Rwandan citizen, It is easy 
to file taxes, I do NOT know any other trader/businessman and It is pretty hard to understand 
the tax system. Results show an increase in the item count when the sensitive item (The tax 
system is unfair) is added to the non-sensitive item list, from 1.99 to 2.18. That means that 
about 20 per cent of the sample thinks that the tax system is unfair. However, this result is 
slightly lower than what emerged from the direct question. This means that there seems to 
be no bias on the taxpayers’ side in reporting unfairness. Some groups experience a more 
prominent disclosure of unfairness perceptions, such as CIT (24 per cent), taxpayers outside 
of Kigali (26 per cent), male taxpayers (23 per cent) and active taxpayers (23 per cent). Non-
filers are the least likely to believe that the system is unfair (8 per cent). 
 
Trust in and perceived professionalism of RRA. The non-sensitive list was the same as 
the one above, while the sensitive item was Sometimes RRA officials are incompetent/ 
unprofessional. Results show that about 24 per cent of the sample believes that RRA is 
unprofessional: a slightly higher percentage than for the indicator on trust, but in line with the 
results on the incidence of bribes – another direct question we have in our survey. We find a 
higher incidence of this perception for CIT (24 per cent), outside of Kigali (27 per cent), male 
taxpayers (23 per cent) and nil-filers (29 per cent). The latter in particular is in line with the 
greater distrust that nil-filers have towards RRA. While perceptions of professionalism and 
trust are generally good, even in the list experiment, there is some scope for improvement in 
this area as a sizeable minority of taxpayers view the RRA as unprofessional. 
 
Overall, the list experiments do not reveal large or significant biases in our survey data.  
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Appendix 2 Tables  
 
Table A1 Variables description 
 




What is the current status of your 
business? 
=1 if temporarily or 
permanently closed 
by government 
measures or due to 
regulatory or 
operational 
challenges related to 
COVID-19 









5,966 892 2,544 3,181 
Received any 
support 
In the last 2 months, have you 
received food, cash or any other 
support from the authorities or other 
groups/ associations/ companies that 
you did not usually receive before the 
crisis? 
=1 if Yes - 69.8 22.4 31.7 
Accessed any 
tax relief 
In the last 2 months, did you 
experience any of the following tax 
relief for the formal taxes you usually 
pay? 
=1 if Yes to any of 
the 3 reliefs below 
- 41.0 8.1 25.9 
Accessed tax 
deferral 
In the last 2 months, did you 
experience any of the following tax 
relief for the formal taxes you usually 
pay? 
= 1 if Yes to delayed 
fling/paying deadline 
 39.3 4.6 23.6 
Accessed tax 
waiver 
In the last 2 months, did you 
experience any of the following tax 
relief for the formal taxes you usually 
pay? 
= 1 if Yes to tax 
waiver 
- 2.0 1.9 0.9 
Accessed any 
tax reduction 
In the last 2 months, did you 
experience any of the following tax 
relief for the formal taxes you usually 
pay? 
= 1 if Yes to tax 
reduction 
– 1.3 3.3 3.1 
Accessed any 
local tax relief 
In the last 2 months, did you 
experience any of the following relief 
for the local fee you usually pay? 
= 1 if Yes to any of 
the 3 reliefs as 
above 
– 23.1 4.0 7.4 
Unfairness According to you, is the following 
statement true or false: The tax 
system is unfair. 
= 1 if True 16.7 15.4 15.6 25.8 
Trust How much trust or mistrust do you 
have that the RRA acts in the interest 
of taxpayers like you? 
= 1 if a lot of trust or 
some trust 
83.3 80.3 88.7 86.9 
Financial 
constraints 
Which of the following statements is 
closest to your view? 
Statement 1: Taxpayers should 
always declare their full income for tax 
purposes, regardless of their financial 
constraints. 
Statement 2: Taxpayers in financial 
distress could declare less income in 
order to pay a smaller tax. 
= 1 if Yes to 
statement 2 




Statement 1: Taxpayers must pay 
their taxes to the government, 
regardless of the quality of public 
services. Statement 2: Taxpayers 
could refuse to pay taxes if they are 
not receiving public services of 
adequate quality. 
= 1 if Yes to 
statement 2 
19.6 25.7 28.4 25.7 
Never justify Please tell me for following statement 
whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or 
something in between. The range 
goes from 1 (never justified) to 5 
(always justified): Some people not 
paying the taxes on their income. 
= 1 if never justify 90 85.2 4.0 86 
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Table A2 Sample summary statistics at baseline 
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Declaration reports tax> 0 2023 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Nil-filer 2023 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Non-filer 2023 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
PIT payer 2023 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
CIT payer 2023 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Based in Kigali 2023 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 
VAT registered 2023 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Female 2023 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Rwandan 2023 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Respondent is owner 2023 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Business is operative 2023 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Has tax accountant 2023 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Hours spent on tax 1811 4.01 8.23 0.00 80.00 
Has EBM 2023 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Keeps books 2023 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Has no employees 2018 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Monthly sales (USD) 1655 5,966 44,645 0.00 932,923 
N 2023 
    
Notes: Summary statistics based on Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey at baseline.  





Table A3 Mean differences by number of follow-up rounds 
 
 Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference 
      
Active 0.52 500 0.52 1503 0.00 
Nil-filer 0.28 500 0.24 1503 0.05** 
Non-filer 0.19 500 0.24 1503 -0.05** 
PIT 0.66 520 0.78 1503 -0.12*** 
CIT 0.34 520 0.22 1503 0.12*** 
Kigali 0.75 520 0.58 1503 0.17*** 
VAT reg. 0.26 520 0.18 1503 0.08*** 
Female 0.39 500 0.33 1503 0.07*** 
Age group 3.20 497 3.34 1501 -0.14*** 
Educ. level 5.62 483 4.98 1464 0.64*** 
Rwandan 0.95 500 0.97 1503 -0.02*** 
No social media 0.17 500 0.26 1503 -0.09*** 
No TV 0.27 500 0.26 1503 0.01 
Owner 0.79 500 0.82 1503 -0.03 
Operative 0.85 500 0.87 1503 -0.02 
Tax accountant 0.25 500 0.16 1503 0.08*** 
Hours on tax 5.08 435 3.64 1358 1.44*** 
Has EBM 0.15 500 0.10 1503 0.05*** 
Info from RRA 0.57 500 0.51 1503 0.06*** 
Books 0.52 500 0.44 1503 0.07*** 
Emails 0.24 500 0.15 1503 0.09*** 
Bank 0.38 500 0.30 1503 0.08*** 
Trade 0.65 500 0.68 1503 -0.02 
No employees 0.53 498 0.55 1500 -0.02 
Monthly sales USD 8792.30 382 5149.16 1256 3643.14 
N 2023 
    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 based on t-test of statistical significance of mean differences. 
 
  
Less than 3 3 rounds 
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Table A4 Determinants of getting access to formal tax relief in round 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Demo + business Perceptions All 
Female 0.02  0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Age -0.04∗∗  -0.04** 
 (0.02)  (0.02) 
High education 0.10∗  0.10∗ 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
Kigali 0.02  0.02 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Trade 0.01  0.01 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
CIT 0.08  0.08 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
Books -0.00  0.00 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
Tax accountant 0.01  0.00 
 (0.05)  (0.05) 
Tax knowledge 0.03***  0.03** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Monthly sales 0.02  0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Uses social media 0.08  0.07 
 (0.06)  (0.06) 
Get info from RRA 0.07*  0.06 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Trust RRA  -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Audit 100%  0.01 -0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Bribe in audit  -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
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Unfair system  -0.13*** -0.10** 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Never justify evasion  0.02 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Mean of dep. Variable 0.56 0.56 0.56 
R-sq. 0.121 0.037 0.136 
Observations 592 592 592 
  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
coefficients are OLS estimates from a LPM. High education is an 
indicator for whether the taxpayer has post-secondary education. Tax 
knowledge is a score ranging from a min 0 to a max of 8 and indicates 
the correct answers given in a 8-item quiz on tax. Uses online tools 
takes value 1 if the taxpayer is registered for e-tax and/or mobile 
declaration. Get info from RRA indicates whether the taxpayer receives 
information on tax matters from RRA staff or RRA official channels. 
Trust in RRA is an indicator variable for whether the taxpayer has a lot 
or some trust that the RRA acts in the interest of taxpayers like them. 
Audit 100% takes value 1 if the perceived probability of getting audited 
by RRA is 100%. Bribe in audit is an indicator for whether the taxpayer 
thinks that side payments are required with RRA during an audit. Unfair 
system takes value 1 if the taxpayer perceives the tax system to be 
unfair. Never justify evasion indicates whether the taxpayer believes 




Table A5 Changes in tax attitudes over time, single waves – FE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unfairness Trust Never justify Cond. Compl. Uncond. Compl. Fin. constraints 
May ’20 -0.10*** -0.03** 0.05*** 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** 
 




0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04*** 
 




0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03* 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Monthly sales Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Baseline Y 0.26 0.83 0.85 0.20 0.80 0.28 
R-sq. 0.023 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.004 
Observations 6969 7269 7258 6998 6998 6986 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. FE: fixed effects. 
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Table A6 Changes in tax attitudes over time, single waves – FE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unfairness Trust Never justify Cond. Compl. Uncond. Compl. Fin. constraints 
May ’20 -0.11*** -0.09*** 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05** 
 




0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04** 
 




0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Business Closure -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
0.05∗ 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
May ’20*Closure’ 0.02 
0.12*** -0.06** 
0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sep ’20*Closure 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
-0.08* 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Monthly sales Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Baseline Y 0.26 0.83 0.85 0.20 0.80 0.28 
R-sq. 0.023 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.005 
Observations 6969 7269 7258 6998 6998 6986 




Table A7 Changes in tax attitudes over time, single waves – FE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Unfairness Trust Never justify Cond. Compl. Uncond. Compl. Fin. constraints 
May ’20 -0.12*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.06*** 
 




0.08*** -0.08*** -0.04*** 
 







(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tax relief -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 




0.03 -0.03 0.05 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sep ’20*Tax relief’ -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Monthly sales Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Baseline Y 0.26 0.83 0.85 0.20 0.80 0.28 
R-sq. 0.023 0.006 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.004 
Observations 6834 6997 7117 6861 6861 6850 




Table A8 Mean differences by filing before or on/after 25 March 2020 
 
 




PIT 0.75 740 0.60 645 0.16*** 
CIT 0.25 740 0.40 645 -0.16*** 
Kigali 0.65 740 0.61 645 0.04 
VAT reg. 0.19 740 0.38 645 -0.19∗∗∗ 
Total tax 152446.88 740 1847834.62 645 -1695387.74 
Total income 29572273.06 740 1.69e+08 645 
-1.39e+08*** 
Nil return 0.36 740 
 




No employees 0.58 738 0.42 643 
0.16*** 
Monthly sales (USD) 2818.21 596 13349.27 530 
-10531.06*** 
High education 0.36 524 0.50 452 
-0.14*** 
Uses online tools 0.59 740 0.70 645 -0.11*** 
Uses a tax accountant 0.17 740 0.31 645 -0.14*** 
Hours on tax 3.93 671 5.19 564 -1.26** 
EBM use 0.09 740 0.22 645 -0.13*** 
Tax knowledge 3.64 740 3.99 645 
-0.35*** 
Trust in RRA 0.86 721 0.82 634 
0.04* 
Has a bank account 0.29 740 0.44 645 -0.15*** 
N 1385 
    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. High education is an indicator variable for whether the 
taxpayer has post-secondary education. Uses online tools takes value 1 if the taxpayer is 
registered for e-tax and/or M-declaration. Tax knowledge is a score ranging from a min 0 to a 
max of 8 and indicates the correct answers given in a 8-item quiz on tax. Trust in RRA is an 
indicator variable for whether the taxpayer has a lot or some trust that the RRA acts in the 





Table A9 Mean differences by filing before or on/after 25 March 2019 
 
 




PIT 0.76 640 0.65 923 0.11*** 
CIT 0.24 640 0.35 923 -0.11*** 
Kigali 0.65 640 0.62 923 0.03 
VAT reg. 0.20 640 0.30 923 -0.09*** 
Total tax 118718.70 640 863434.11 923 -744715.41 
Total income 18961228.82 640 1.07e+08 923 
-8.80e+07** 





0.29 923 0.09*** 
 Survey data     
No employees 0.59 638 0.46 920 0.13*** 
Monthly sales (USD) 3409.78 512 10280.84 751 -6871.06** 
High education 0.36 524 0.50 452 -0.14*** 
Uses online tools 0.60 640 0.65 923 -0.04* 
Uses a tax accountant 0.17 640 0.25 923 -0.08*** 
Hours on tax 4.14 574 4.62 822 -0.48 
EBM use 0.11 640 0.16 923 -0.05** 
Tax knowledge 3.70 640 3.76 923 -0.06 
Trust in RRA 0.84 625 0.83 905 0.01 
Has a bank account 0.28 640 0.41 923 -0.13*** 
N 1563 
    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. High education is an indicator variable for whether the 
taxpayer has post-secondary education. Uses online tools takes value 1 if the taxpayer is 
registered for e-tax and/or M-declaration. Tax knowledge is a score ranging from a min 0 to a 
max of 8 and indicates the correct answers given in an 8-item quiz on tax. Trust in RRA is an 
indicator variable for whether the taxpayer has a lot or some trust that the RRA acts in the 





Table A10 Mean differences by filing before or on/after 25 March 2018 
 




PIT 0.72 535 0.49 469 
0.22*** 
CIT 0.28 535 0.51 469 
-0.22*** 
Kigali 0.55 535 0.61 469 
-0.05* 
VAT reg. 0.23 535 0.43 469 
-0.19*** 
Total tax 133389.54 535 478000.32 469 
-344610.78*** 
Total income 17937106.28 535 1.39e+08 469 -1.21e+08*** 
Nil return 0.33 535 0.30 469 0.03 
 Survey data    
No employees 0.53 532 0.36 468 0.17*** 
Monthly sales (USD) 2997.85 429 16841.12 376 -13843.27*** 
High education 0.36 524 0.50 452 -0.14*** 
Uses online tools 0.65 535 0.68 469 -0.03 
Uses a tax accountant 0.19 535 0.36 469 -0.16*** 
Hours on tax 4.00 481 6.07 404 -2.07*** 
EBM use 0.13 535 0.23 469 -0.10*** 
Tax knowledge 3.75 535 3.91 469 -0.16 
Trust in RRA 0.86 521 0.82 463 0.04 
Has a bank account 0.31 535 0.50 469 -0.19*** 
N 1004 
    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. High education is an indicator variable for whether the 
taxpayer has post-secondary education. Uses online tools takes value 1 if the taxpayer is 
registered for e-tax and/or M-declaration. Tax knowledge is a score ranging from a min 0 to a 
max of 8 and indicates the correct answers given in a 8-item quiz on tax. Trust in RRA is an 
indicator variable for whether the taxpayer has a lot or some trust that the RRA acts in the 





Table A11 Impact of tax deferral on income tax remitted 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Main w/out income w/out nil-filers 
Treat*2019 628,561* 764,943* 734,345* 
 
(327,912) (405,529) (438,469) 
Treat*2018 4,033 87,561 -142,248 
 
(340,152) (320,060) (517,174) 
Treat*2017 133,410 142,589 87,080 
 
(221,510) (237,601) (296,103) 
Treat*2016 162,304 207,386 106,781 
 
(212,548) (224,606) (282,401) 
Treat*2015 71,521 120,315 84,437 
 
(236,818) (246,132) (312,555) 
Treat*2014 -271,952 -151,556 -496,684 
 
(228,748) (220,076) (338,772) 
Treat*2013 -382,937 -313,786 -521,087 
 
(241,134) (269,072) (328,487) 
Treat*2012 -3,133 149,159 140,832 
 
(267,160) (261,465) (350,377) 












Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Control Mean 528,042 528,042 761,081 
R-sq. 0.028 0.005 0.027 
Observations 5650 5650 3920 




Table A12 Impact of tax deferral on income tax remitted 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Winsorise Top 1pc Drop Top 1pc Drop Top 5 firms 
Treat*2019 185,783 91,523 386,744* 
 
(178,925) (169,190) (224,713) 
Treat*2018 136,497 41,989 281,265 
 
(179,008) (171,231) (211,088) 
Treat*2017 9,885 8,285 141,489 
 
(190,956) (186,856) (226,454) 
Treat*2016 75,943 32,052 187,718 
 
(178,863) (165,995) (215,557) 
Treat*2015 40,706 73,830 102,834 
 
(196,713) (181,058) (238,627) 
Treat*2014 -168,639 -105,326 -199,785 
 
(187,590) (175,181) (215,579) 
Treat*2013 -329,954 -246,058 -346,708 
 
(213,183) (197,801) (254,352) 
Treat*2012 -792 -11,575 86,440 
 
(182,707) (191,580) (251,216) 




(176,031) (169,152) (201,328) 
Income 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Control Mean 272,682 208,864 318,158 
R-sq. 0.056 0.043 0.048 
Observations 5650 5610 5648 




Appendix 3 Figures 
Figure A1 Confirmed cases of COVID-19 per million people in Rwanda 
 
Source: Our World in Data 2021. 
Figure A2 Stringency index in Rwanda 
 




Figure A3 Likelihood of contributing to new COVID-19 projects 
 
Notes: results based on data from the Rwanda National Taxpayer 
Survey. 
Figure A4 Shifts in perceptions about the fairness of informal 
contributions 
 
Notes: results based on Rwanda National Taxpayer Survey. Graphs 
show coefficients from fixed effects regressions on the relevant 
outcome, indicated at the top of each graph. We can measure outcomes 
thanks to a question on the overall fairness of all informal contributions 
(i.e. not those on projects specific to the crisis), which we included in all 
survey rounds, including baseline. This change is relatively sizeable: 





Figure A5 Change in solidarity one year after COVID-19 
outbreak 
 
Notes: results based on data from the Rwanda National Taxpayer 
Survey. Survey question reads: Comparing the period before COVID 
and today, would you say that people are now: more likely to help each 
other/less likely to help each other/about the same. 
Figure A6 Change in patriotism one year after COVID-19 
outbreak 
 
Notes: results based on data from the Rwanda National Taxpayer 
Survey. Survey question reads: Comparing the period before COVID 
and today, would you say that people are now: more proud to be 





Figure A7 Shifts in attitudes and perceptions: CIT vs. PIT 
 
(a) CIT payers 
 




















Figure A10 Shifts in attitudes and perceptions: top quintile vs. rest 
 
(a) Top quintile 
 




Figure A11 Shifts in attitudes and perceptions: compliance 
categories 
 
(a) Actives at baseline 
 
(b) Nil-filers at baseline 
 
(c) Non-filers at baseline  
54 
 
Figure A12 Shifts in compliance behaviour – without nil-
filers 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 
from a fixed effects regression. 
Figure A13 Shifts in compliance behaviour – 
without business income 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 




Figure A14 Shifts in compliance behaviour: cut-off 
date 14 March 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 
from a fixed effects regression. 
Figure A15 Shifts in compliance behaviour: cut-off 
date 21 March 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 




Figure A16: Shifts in compliance behaviour: 
business income 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 
from a fixed effects regression. 
Figure A17 Shifts in compliance behaviour: operating 
expenses 
 
Notes: results based on RRA’s administrative data, for the survey 
sample. Graphs show difference-in-difference coefficients (treat x year) 




Figure A18 Shifts in compliance behaviour: CIT vs. PIT 
 
(a) CIT payers 
 
 

























Figure A21 Shifts in compliance behaviour: by size (deciles of 
sales) 
 








Figure A22 Shifts in compliance behaviour: by compliance 
category 
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